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The message was dated Tuesday, 2 June 2003. “From the
Executive Committee, XIX International Congress of Bio-
chemistry & Molecular Biology: After careful consideration,
the 2003 Congress Executive and Steering Committees have
concluded that it is in the best interest of all delegates,
exhibitors, sponsors and partners that the IUBMB Congress
scheduled for Toronto this July 20-24 be cancelled. On April
29 we issued a worldwide message informing you that the
first outbreak of SARS and the travel alert issued by the
Center for Disease Control and travel advisory issued by the
World Health Organization were being monitored and, at
that time, we thought the worst was over and the Congress
could proceed as planned. With the most recent outbreak of
SARS being reported so close to the Congress we have heard
from many individuals concerned that if they were to attend
the meeting in Toronto and be exposed to SARS they could
potentially spread the disease to others in their health-care
system including colleagues and patients. The number of
participants and speakers has dropped to the point that it is
no longer possible to hold a successful congress.” 
Ironically, the day of that message, news stories were circu-
lating all over the world that the epidemic of SARS (severe
acute respiratory syndrome) had peaked and was starting to
taper off. SARS, which appears to be caused by a new strain
of coronavirus, kills around 10% of those infected; interest-
ingly, mortality seems to arise from the severity of the vic-
tim’s own immune response rather than from any toxic
effect of the virus per se. The outbreaks in Vietnam and
Canada have largely been confined to health-care workers
and patients in hospitals; in Hong Kong and China, the
disease spread beyond that. Although ten times as many
people die each day from malaria than have died in toto from
SARS, this new infectious disease has crippled the economies
of cities and countries, caused some places to institute dra-
conian quarantine measures reminiscent of the days of the
Black Death, and generally scared the living daylights out of
most of Asia and a good chunk of the rest of the world.
So now the army of the men of death, in John Bunyan’s
memorable phrase, has a new recruit, and fear has a new
face: a face wearing a surgical mask. 
I think one reason for the extreme fear is that SARS is passed
from person to person. There is something in human nature
that makes us more afraid of other people than, for example,
of insects, even though insect-borne diseases have killed, and
continue to kill, far more than any human-transmitted
illness. Added to that is our fear of the new and unknown: we
live with influenza, a much more dangerous disease, because
we are used to it. Consequently, SARS has caused much more
economic damage than its prevalence warrants. 
SARS has brought home the importance of being able to
trust your government. One of the reasons it spread as it did
in some countries is that people did not believe what they
were told, and fled from or to the cities, taking the disease
with them. It has also reemphasized the folly of commingling
humans and livestock as we do. Farming practices that raise
chickens and wild birds - both notorious reservoirs of viruses
- in the same pens as pigs, whose immune system resembles
ours sufficiently that an avian virus that learns to adapt to
swine can often jump to humans, must be stopped. Controls
also need to be instituted on open-air markets where a huge
variety of live wild animals, many of uncertain provenance,
are often held in close proximity to one another and to
throngs of people. 
SARS has also demonstrated that the immediate impact of
genomics on human health is not in the over-hyped realm of
finding cures to all manner of complex conditions such as
cancer and heart disease. It is in the development of tech-
nologies that will revolutionize public health. The complete
genome sequence of the SARS-associated coronavirus was
obtained less than two months after the disease was first
identified, which is surely a record. It was obtained by the
whole-genome shotgun sequencing method that was devel-
oped for much larger microbial and mammalian genomes.
And even before that, DeRisi and associates at the Universityof California San Francisco used one of the great tools of
genomics, the cDNA microarray, to identify the SARS virus
as a coronavirus. It took them only about 24 hours after
receiving their first tissue sample, with the aid of a microarray
containing gene fragments from 1,000 different viruses, to
type SARS as a new strain of coronavirus, suggesting that
this technology could be invaluable in the first days of, for
example, a biowarfare incident. 
Yet the story of SARS to date has also highlighted our igno-
rance. We have the complete genome sequence of the virus,
yet we cannot state with certainty how many genes it con-
tains, which are expressed under what conditions, or which
are essential for human infectivity and virulence. Clearly,
our ability to gather information about genes has out-
stripped our ability to interpret that information, and much
work will be needed to understand what even a simple
genome sequence implies. 
Just as the SARS epidemic seems to be coming under control
- this year, anyway; it remains to be seen if it will become
endemic anywhere - other candidates are queuing at the
recruiting station. Since the mid-1970s, about 30 new infec-
tious diseases have cropped up, ranging from AIDS (for
which 45 million new infections are predicted between now
and 2010) to Ebola virus, a new outbreak of which is still
raging in Africa as I write this. The Netherlands has been
wrestling with a new strain of avian influenza that has devas-
tated its poultry farms - about 20% of the country’s chickens
have had to be slaughtered - and infected 80 humans, one of
whom has died. Twelve confirmed cases of monkeypox, a
disease related to smallpox but previously unknown in the
Western Hemisphere, have just been reported in Wisconsin
and several other midwestern US states; another 50 or so
unconfirmed cases are under investigation. Prairie dogs,
cute little rodents that have recently become popular as pets,
appear to be the immediate source of human infection; they,
in turn, were probably infected by a West African rat kept at
the same pet supplier. Monkeypox is much less lethal than
smallpox, causing fatalities in only a small proportion of
cases (for smallpox it can be 30% or more), and even that
figure comes from developing countries where those infected
are less healthy overall and available medical care is less
sophisticated, so there is probably no reason to be concerned
yet. Still, this incident is yet another example of how vulner-
able even the developed world can be to diseases that were
formerly considered Someone Else’s Problem. And West
Nile virus, another developing world disease that has now
become endemic in the US, is about to pay its annual mos-
quito-borne visit as the summer commences. 
In considering how we respond to these threats, I would
contend that market forces are fine for controlling some
things but disastrous for others. Left to themselves, pharma-
ceutical manufacturers phased out many of their infectious
disease programs during the last few decades of the twentieth
century because, thanks to antibiotics, there didn’t seem to
be a market for new antiinfectives in the West, or in the
developed countries of the Far East. But now, along with the
‘new’ plagues, a number of ‘old’ diseases, such as tuberculo-
sis (Bunyan’s “Captain of all the men of death”), staphylo-
coccus, enterococcus and streptococcus infections, are
turning up in drug-resistant forms, and suddenly there is a
scramble to resurrect these old research programs, and
microbiology is becoming a fashionable discipline again. 
No better argument for the importance of basic research
programs at universities need be sought. If academic
research followed fashion, and only did what was immedi-
ately believed to be relevant - or worse, only did what indus-
try and government thought was needed - there might be no
reservoir of expertise for situations such as the one we now
face. The rise of infectious diseases emphasizes the impor-
tance of universities as guardians of old knowledge as well as
discoverers of new. Funding agencies and academic admin-
istrators need to ensure that fields don’t die out prematurely.
None of us is smart enough to predict what will be important
in the future. 
Our generation has grown up not knowing what it was like
when every wound was potentially life-threatening, when
every cough could signal a deadly illness. But the line
between our blithe present and the frightening past is finer
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what happens when the public health infrastructure is
neglected, or worse, collapses altogether. Diphtheria is once
again endemic in parts of the former Soviet Union. Cholera
epidemics are occurring with disturbing frequency in parts of
India, Bangladesh, and Africa. Over 100,000 people are
believed to have died from infectious disease outbreaks in Iraq
following the first Gulf War, and serious public health issues
are developing in southern Iraq following the latest one. 
Infectious diseases aren’t making a comeback; they never
left. SARS is merely the latest reminder that, no matter how
clever we are, the men of death are always out there, waiting.
And the men of death are always hungry.
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